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RIGHT ANSWER TO THE WRONG QUESTION:
ESTATE OFSTEVENS AND WHAT "SUPPORT" MEANS
FOR SOUTH CAROLINA TRUST BENEFICIARIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Jeremy Bentham, the eighteenth and nineteenth century English philosopher
and political radical, spent most of his life critiquing the existing common law
and strongly advocating legal reform.' He criticized the common law approach
for not being a clear, comprehensive, rational code built upon general principles.
Instead he saw it as a sea of "'non-cognoscible' and trackless" decisions.2 He
referred to common law as "dog-law" because it does not tell a man beforehand
what it is that he should not do, just as a master waits for a dog to misbehave and
then punishes him:
It is the Judges (as we have seen) that make the common
law:-Do you know how they make it? Just as a man makes
laws for his dog. When your dog does any thing you want to
break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it.
This is the way you make laws for your dog: and this is the way
the Judges make law for you and me. They won't tell a man
before hand what it is he should not do, they won't so much as
allow of his being told: they lie by till he has done something
which they say he should not have done, and then they hang
him for it.3
At no time does this criticism prove truer than when a court faces a novel
issue of law, as up to that point in time, the parties may have no indication from
the courts on how to appropriately transact. The South Carolina Court of
Appeals recently faced an issue of first impression in Estate of Stevens v. Lutch4 :
"[W]hat considerations are appropriate under [a] trust's terms when determining
whether to make a [discretionary] distribution for a beneficiary's 'support?' 5
The case involved a testamentary trust that permitted the trustees to use their
sole discretion to invade the principal for the support of the beneficiaries if the
trustees believed the income derived from the principal, along with other
1. JAMES E. CRIMMINS, ON BENTHAM 1, 45 (2004).
2. H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 73 (1982).
3. JEREMY BENTHAM, TRUTH VERSUS ASHHURST; OR, LAW AS IT IS, CONTRASTED WITH WHAT IT
IS SAID TO BE 11 (1823).
4. 365 S.C. 427, 617 S.E.2d 736 (Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 380 (Nov. 14,
2006).
5. Id. at 431, 617 S.E.2d at 738.
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financial sources, failed to support the beneficiaries.6 Paul Stevens, one of two
beneficiaries of the trust, asked the trustees to exercise their discretionary
authority by distributing funds to enable the private education of his two
children, who were "remainder beneficiaries of the trust."7 A master-in-equity
held that based on an ordinary-meaning analysis of the will, the trustees were
"not authorized to make distributions to the [beneficiaries] for the health,
support, maintenance and education of their current or future children." 8 The
South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the master's decision, holding that
"consideration of a beneficiary's familial obligations falls within a trustee's
discretion when determining what constitutes a proper distribution for the
beneficiary's 'support.' 9
This Note argues the Court of Appeals wrongly decided Estate of Stevens
and should have affirmed the master-in-equity's decision: The terms and
circumstances involved in the creation of the trust reflect the testator's intent for
the trust funds to support only the named beneficiaries and not their current or
future children. This Note does not argue that South Carolina courts should
always narrowly interpret the term support to exclude support of a beneficiary's
children; however, the peculiar terms and circumstances of the Stevens trust call
for such a narrow interpretation.
Part II of this Note provides the factual background for Estate of Stevens,
focusing particularly on important details absent from the opinion. Part III
reviews the court's analysis and explains why the court failed to answer the
issue of this case based on the terms of the Stevens trust. Part IV further
discusses why the terms and circumstances surrounding the trust, along with
South Carolina case law and other legal authorities, should have led the court to
affirm the master-in-equity's decision. Part V concludes by discussing the effect
Estate of Stevens will have on South Carolina testators and beneficiaries.
II. THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF ESTATE OF STEVENS
Niles Stevens died February 24, 1984 and left a will (Will) that established
the Stevens testamentary trust.' 0 The court recited the language of the trust:
[M]y trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of my said
children, LAURA STEVENS and PAUL STEVENS, such sums
from the principal or accumulated income of this trust as in his
sole discretion shall be necessary or advisable from time to
time for the health, education, support and maintenance of my
said children, LAURA STEVENS and PAUL STEVENS,
6. Id. at 429-30, 617 S.E.2d at 737.
7. Id. at 430, 617 S.E.2d at 737.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 433, 617 S.E.2d at 739.
10. Id. at 429, 617 S.E.2d at 737.
[Vol. 58: 603
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taking into consideration to the extent my trustee deems
advisable any other income or resources of my said children...
known to my trustee."
The court used ellipses near the end of the quoted language to replace
"LAURA STEVENS and PAUL STEVENS," a third use of the testator's
children's names in all capital letters.' 2 The court's decision not to include these
important terms in its opinion evidences its failure to base its holding on the
particular terms of the trust in question. The court then noted that
upon the death of either [beneficiary], the trust directs that the
decedent's one-half interest shall be distributed to the issue of
the deceased beneficiary. Should either die leaving no issue, the
trust would remain intact for the benefit of the survivor and
ultimately distributed to the issue of the surviving beneficiary. 3
Although the court of appeals recited only this language of the Will in its
opinion, the Will contained several other significant provisions. The Will left the
balance of the residuary estate to be held in trust:
1. One-half ('/2) of the net income thereqfro]m shall be paid to
or applied for the benefit of my daughter, LAURA
STEVENS, during her lifetime.
2. The sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) per annum, not
to exceed one-half ( ) the net income of this trust, shall be
paid to or applied for the benefit of my son, PAUL
STEVENS, from the net income of the trust during his
lifetime. 1
4
While the court stated the approximate value of the trust was $6 million, 5 it
failed to note that Laura, because of this trust provision, receives substantially
more income per year than Paul. While Laura receives $116,000 to $125,000,
Paul receives only $8,000 to $17,000.6
11. Id. at 429-30, 617 S.E.2d at 737 (alteration in original).
12. Record on Appeal at 114, Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. 427, 617 S.E.2d 736 (Ct. App. 2005),
cert denied, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 360 (Nov. 14, 2006) (No. 3993).
13. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 430, 617 S.E.2d at 737. This Note argues the court mislabeled
the beneficiaries' interests. See infra Part III.A.
14. Record on Appeal, supra note 12, at 114.
15. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 430, 617 S.E.2d at 737.
16. Record on Appeal, supra note 12, at 41. These figures include the amount of income payable
to the beneficiaries according to the trust terms, as well as any additional income or principal the trustee
deemed necessary for the health, support, education, and maintenance of the specific beneficiaries.
2007]
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The Will's spendthrift provision 7 stated that "[a]ll payments of principal
and i[n]come payable or to become payable to the beneficiary of any trust
created hereunder shall not be . . . subject to the debts, contracts, obligations,
liabilities or torts of any beneficiary."' 18 The Will defined "children" as "the
lawful blood descendants in the first degree of the parent designated."' 9 The
court noted that at the time of the litigation, Paul Stevens had two minor children
and Laura Stevens had no children;2" however, at the time of Niles Stevens's
death, both of the two beneficiaries of the trust were unmarried and had no
children.2' Paul Stevens's annual income was usually less than $25,000, and the
cost of the private education he wished to provide his minor children was
usually less than $5,000 annually.
22
Paul Stevens requested the trustees distribute trust funds to pay for the
private education of his two minor children.23 Uncertain of whether they could
make the requested distribution, the trustees sought a declaratory judgment from
the probate court to determine the extent of their discretionary authority.24 The
case was removed to the circuit court and then referred to the master-in-equity.
The master narrowly construed the trustees' discretionary power. Under "the
ordinary meaning of the language used in the Will, the Trustees are not
authorized to make distributions to [the beneficiaries] for the health, support,
maintenance and education of their current or future children. '26 The court of
appeals reversed the master's decision,27 holding that "consideration of a
beneficiary's familial obligations falls within a trustee's discretion when
determining what constitutes a proper distribution for the beneficiary's
'support.' 28
This Note refers to this more complete factual background (facts cited in the
opinion plus facts from the Record on Appeal) throughout its analysis of Estate
of Stevens to support the conclusion that the South Carolina Court of Appeals
should have affirmed the master-in-equity's decision; under the peculiar terms of
the trust, the testator did not intend for the trust's funds to support the
beneficiaries' current or future children.
17. A spendthrift trust prohibits the beneficiary from assigning her interest, while also preventing
a creditor from attaching that interest. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1552 (8th ed. 2004). See generally
1 S. ALAN MEDLIN, ESTATE PLANNING IN SOUTH CAROLINA: THE LAW OF WILLS AND TRUSTS
§ 508.2(a) (2002) (providing an analysis of spendthrift provisions and their use under South Carolina
law).
18. Record on Appeal, supra note 12, at 119.
19.Id.
20. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 430, 617 S.E.2d at 737.
21. Record on Appeal, supra note 12, at 28.
22. See id. at 37.
23. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 430, 617 S.E.2d at 737.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 434, 617 S.E.2d at 739.
28. Id. at 433, 617 S.E.2d at 739.
[Vol. 58: 603
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I11. UNDERSTANDING THE TERMS OF THE TRUST IN ESTATE OF STEVENS, THE
FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THEM, AND THE ISSUE THEY
CREATE
The South Carolina Court of Appeals gave the right answer to the wrong
question. This phrase comes from the opening sentence of Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Arizona v. Hicks.29 Just as Justice O'Connor viewed the majority in
Hicks as answering a question different from the one presented to the Court,30
this Note suggests the same regarding the court of appeals's decision in Estate of
Stevens. Although the court of appeals correctly stated the issue as "what
considerations are appropriate under the trust's terms when determining whether
to make a distribution for a beneficiary's 'support,' 3' the court resolved the
issue without referring to the trust's meticulous terms or considering the
situation-specific facts. Instead, the court answered the different question of
what distributions are appropriate for a beneficiary's support under traditional
trust terms, where a single beneficiary or multiple beneficiaries with equal
interests take from the trust. The court's mislabeling of the beneficiaries'
interests in the trust and the cases cited to support its holding show the court's
failure to discern the testator's intent from the particular terms of the trust.
A. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Construed the Trust Terms as Giving
Each Beneficiary a One-Half Interest in the Trust
When describing the remaindermen's provision in the trust, the court stated,
"Upon the death of either [beneficiary], the trust directs that the decedent's one-
half interest shall be distributed to the issue of the deceased beneficiary. 32
However, the beneficiaries never had a one-half interest in the trust. The trust
terms give one beneficiary, Laura Stevens, one-half of the net income from the
trust during her lifetime, while giving the other beneficiary, Paul Stevens, only
$5,000 per year ("not to exceed one-half ... the net income of the trust") during
his lifetime.33 Upon the death of either beneficiary, the trustee shall distribute
one-half of the trust to the issue of the deceased beneficiary.34 Should either of
the beneficiaries die and leave no issue, the entire trust would remain for the
benefit of the surviving beneficiary and ultimately be paid in full to the issue of
that surviving beneficiary.35
Thus, the issue of each beneficiary have a one-half remainder interest in the
principal of the trust, and Paul and Laura, the beneficiaries, clearly do not have
one-half interests in the trust as a whole. Paul Stevens's income interest will
29. 480 U.S. 321, 333 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 431, 617 S.E.2d at 738 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 430, 617 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis added).
33. Record on Appeal, supra note 12, at 114; see supra text accompanying note 16.
34.Id. at 114-15.
35. Id. at 115.
2007]
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never exceed $5,000 of the income derived from a $6 million principal, plus any
additional amount of income or principal the trustee is authorized to distribute
for his health, education, support, and maintenance, even if Laura dies before
him. This error by the court reveals it overlooked the terms of the trust-the
testator intentionally gave significantly more financial interest to one beneficiary
than to the other. The court instead resolved the issue of this case based on the
terms of a more traditional trust, where two beneficiaries share equally.
B. The Court Erroneously Relied on Distinguishable Cases to Support its
Holding
Further proof that the court of appeals did not resolve Estate of Stevens
based on the peculiar terms of the trust exists in the cases cited in the opinion.
The court began to justify its holding by stating, "[W]e are persuaded by the
rationale of several other jurisdictions deciding similar, if not identical,
matters, 36 but the court misidentified the cases as "similar, if not identical."
This part will explain the distinguishing characteristics of the cases. In fact, the
court's analysis of these cases proves analogous to a movie preview that pulls
every great one-liner out of the script to convince viewers it is
worthwhile-when it only proves to be a bust.
The most distinguishable factors between Estate of Stevens and the cited
cases are the terms of the trusts and the testator's knowledge of a beneficiary's
family at the time of the testator's death. Not one case the court cited dealt with
a trust that gave two beneficiaries unequal amounts of income derived from the
principal; nor does any case the court cited include a beneficiary who was
unmarried and childless at the creation of the trust as well as at the time of the
testator's death. Following are discussions of the four cases the court found
persuasive.3 7
1. Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust Co.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals cited Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust
Co.3" as follows:
[T]he Indiana Court of Appeals, interpreting a trust for the
support, maintenance, and enjoyment of a beneficiary,
approved distributions to the beneficiary even though they
36. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 432, 617 S.E.2d at 738.
37. The court follows Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 48 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943)
(en banc); Eaton v. Lovering, 125 A. 433 (N.H. 1924); Finch v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 577 S.E.2d
306 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); and First National Bank of Beaumont v. Howard, 229 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.
1950). See Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 432, 617 S.E.2d at 738. These cases involved testamentary
trusts, and the courts used various terms to refer to the person who created the trust. Where practical,
this Note will refer to the person who created the trust as the testator.
38.48 N.E.2d 181.
[Vol. 58: 603
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predominately benefited his wife and children. Explaining its
conclusions, the court held, "[t]he needs of a married man
include not only needs personal to him, but also the needs of
his family living with him and entitled to his support."39
However, the Indiana Court of Appeals did not interpret the language "support,
maintenance, and enjoyment" as the South Carolina Court of Appeals believed,
because this language did not come from the provision considered by the
Robison court.4" Robison discussed the final paragraph of Item J of the will in
question, which authorized the trustees, in their discretion, to use the principal of
the beneficiary's trust should the beneficiary "be stricken by some serious illness
or disease, or overtaken by some accident, misfortune or disaster and require for
his . . . care, attendance or support a sum or sums in excess of all of his ...
income provided for in this will ... [as is] proper and reasonably required for his
... welfare and proper care."'" The South Carolina Court of Appeals's failure to
cite the relevant provision in Robison supports the assertion that the court did
not address the issue before it based on the particular terms of the Stevens trust,
but instead upon general terms used by traditional trusts.
Because the South Carolina Court of Appeals incorrectly cited the language
before the Robison court, further analysis of the terms and circumstances of the
trust involved in that case is necessary. In Robison, the testator established a
trust for her nephew as the sole beneficiary.42 In 1927, physicians diagnosed the
beneficiary with dementia praecox43 based on information provided by his wife,
and the disease became increasingly worse with no signs of recovery.44
Physicians advised the beneficiary to travel to California in the hope that "a
quiet outdoor life might retard the progress of the malady"; 45 however, the
beneficiary lacked funds for the move as well as the ability to earn the funds by
39. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 432, 617 S.E.2d at 738.
40. The language cited by the South Carolina Court of Appeals comes from the provision of the
Robison will authorizing the trustee to pay "the whole net income.., devoted solely to the support,
maintenance and enjoyment" of the beneficiary. Robison, 48 N.E.2d at 183. However, the issue in
Robison centered on the final paragraph of Item J of the testator's will, which authorized the trustee to
invade the principal of the trust upon the occurence of an unforeseen emergency, rather than the
provision authorizing the payment of income as the South Carolina Court of Appeals cited. Id.
To be sure of this distinction, this Note cites Robison directly: "The appellant complains that the
trustee improperly expended portions of the corpus of the trust for the benefit of Alexander's wife and
children, and that this contravened the terms of the will, since such expenditures are limited to those for
the personal needs of Alexander alone while stricken." Id at 189 (emphasis added). Then the court
proceeded to indicate the needs of a married man also include the needs of his family living with him,
id, as the South Carolina Court of Appeals noted.
41. Robison, 48 N.E.2d at 183 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Dementia praecox was a label formerly used for schizophrenia. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 410 (25th ed. 1990).
44. Robison, 48 N.E.2d at 187-88. The court also noted that the beneficiary "was never too alert
mentally" and had a complete nervous breakdown. Id.
45.Id. at 188.
2007]
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either mental or physical endeavor.46 The beneficiary's entire family asked the
trustee to provide $10,000 to establish a home for the beneficiary and his family
in California. 4' The family asserted to the trustee that an emergency requiring
the use of part of the trust corpus existed.48 Before acting, the trustee submitted
the issue to the court.4 9 The court found that an emergency existed, a condition
required for the trustee to invade the principal.50 The court permitted an advance
of a maximum of $10,000 and authorized payment to the beneficiary.5
The trustee brought suit to construe the trust, naming the beneficiary and all
his adult children-remaindermen of the trust-as defendants.52 Two of the
children responded with a cross-claim against the trustee on several grounds,
including inappropriate distributions of the trust for the benefit of the
beneficiary's wife and children. 3 The trial court ruled that all of the trustee's
actions were appropriate, and the direct payment of $10,000 of the principal to
the beneficiary was "authorized under the terms of the will. '5 4 Evidence later
proved the beneficiary never knew the California house had been built on a
portion of the real estate owned by the beneficiary's wife,55 and the court
admitted that some doubt existed as to whether the beneficiary ever actually
suffered from dementia praecox.56 Nevertheless, the Indiana Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision that the $10,000 invasion of the principal
occurred in good faith.57
The most significant distinguishing factor in this case, as compared to Estate
of Stevens, lies in the language of the provisions in question. The Robison
testator gave the beneficiary an interest in the principal of the trust, contingent
on the beneficiary becoming mentally, physically, and financially helpless. 8 No
such emergency contingency existed in the terms of the trust before the South
Carolina Court of Appeals. The Robison court even noted the uniqueness of the
trust language when it stated:
Under the peculiar wording of the clause in question, it is
necessary, before any part of the principal may be used, that the
beneficiary must not only have suffered some misfortune or
disaster, but he must also require for his support and care sums
46. Id.
47. Id. at 184.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 188.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 183.
53. Id. at 183, 189.
54. Id. at 185.
55. Id. at 184.
56. Id. at 188. The court may have been troubled in part because the physicians relied so heavily
on information from his wife, who was "unhappy" in the marriage. See id. at 187-88.
57. Id. at 188-89.
58. Id. at 188.
[Vol. 58: 603
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in excess of the income from the trust and from other sources
59
Thus, the principal could be invaded by the trustee only to support the
beneficiary as his welfare required.
The unique contingent interest of the beneficiary in Robison evinced an
intent that the trustee may invade the principal to support the beneficiary's
family-the testator required the beneficiary to be incapable of supporting
himself financially before invasion of the principal could take place. The South
Carolina Court of Appeals incorrectly recited the language before the Robison
court as "support, maintenance, and enjoyment of a beneficiary."6 Thus, the
court of appeals may not have recognized the Robison beneficiary's contingent
interest as a manifestation of the testator's intent to include the beneficiary's
family, a manifestation of intent that did not exist in the Stevens trust.
Other important factors in Robison that distinguish it from Estate of Stevens
include not only the testator's knowledge, at the creation of the trust and at her
death, that the beneficiary had a wife and children to support,6 but also the
testator's anticipation that the beneficiary would suffer from mental illness.62 In
summary, Robison involved several indicators of the testator's intent: the
requirement that the beneficiary be stricken by illness or disease, the
requirement that income from the trust must be insufficient before authorizing
the trustee to invade the principal, the testator's knowledge that the beneficiary
had a family to support at the time of the creation of the testamentary trust, and
the testator's knowledge and anticipation of the beneficiary's mental illness.
Thus, the totality of the circumstances in Robison strongly supports the
conclusion that "it is hardly probable that the testatrix intended to provide for his
needs and let his wife and children go without. ' 6 3 None of these insightful
factors into the testator's intent existed in Estate of Stevens to support the South
59. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
60. Estate of Stevens v. Lutch, 365 S.C. 427, 432, 617 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005), cert
denied, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 360 (Nov. 14, 2006).
61. The testator executed the will in 1920 and died in 1923. Robison, 48 N.E.2d at 184. The court
stated that in 1926, the beneficiary was 46 years old and married with three children who were "each
of full age" in 1943. Id. This short timeframe implies the testator knew the beneficiary had a family to
support at the time she created the will.
62. The Robison court indicated this when it stated the following:
We are convinced that the primary and controlling purpose of the testator was to
provide for the [beneficiary], whose weaknesses, failings and probable future
requirements were known to her, such care, attention and support as was
reasonably required to provide for [his] welfare so long as [he] might live, having
in mind [his] station in life and the size of the fund.
Id. at 187 (emphasis added). The beneficiary's sister also experienced unfortunate circumstances; the
court noted that Lydia Crawford suffered from "spastic paralysis at or before birth" and was a
"physically helpless invalid all of her life, though mentally alert." Id. at 188. The court found that the
trustee could properly extract principal funds from the beneficiary's sister's trust to support her since
the income she already received proved insufficient. Id.
63. Id. at 189.
2007]
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Carolina Court of Appeal's conclusion that the testator intended, when using the
phrase "support ... of my said children," to include "familial obligations" of the
beneficiary.'
The Robison testator's creation of two testamentary trusts in her will, one
for her nephew, whose trust was subject to litigation, and one for her niece,6S
also distinguishes Robison from Estate of Stevens. The intentional split of the
testator's funds ($65,000 for the nephew and $85,000 for the niece) 66 into two
trusts also evinces the testator's intent to allow the trustee to use the principal for
the beneficiary's wife and children. This division allows the trustee to
generously apply, in his or her discretion, as much of the principal as is needed
to support the beneficiary without affecting the interest of another income
beneficiary. This situation differs from the trust in Estate of Stevens, as the
testator in that case created substantially unequal income interests in a single
trust for two beneficiaries. 67 Thus, the South Carolina Court of Appeal's
approval of Paul Stevens' request for invasion of the principal can affect the
amount of income Laura, the second income beneficiary to the trust, receives.
The final distinguishing factor of Robison relates to the the nature of the
authorized distribution. The distribution to build a house differs from
distribution for the private education requested in Estate of Stevens. The Robison
court authorized the distribution due to the beneficiary's mental condition and its
direct benefit on the beneficiary for his support.68 Robison noted the trial court's
finding:
[T]he payment of the $10,000 was justifiably made directly to
[the beneficiary] in good faith after careful investigation and
after [the trustee] satisfying itself that his condition was such as
to require it to be made from the corpus and was used in the
purchase of the land and in necessary living expenses.69
Although the beneficiary's wife appeared to have fraudulently induced this
distribution, the distribution remains distinguishable from the one approved in
Estate of Stevens. The beneficiary in Robison requested the funds for his
intended use and not solely for the use by a non-beneficiary, like the request to
fund the private education of the beneficiary's minor children in Estate of
Stevens.
64. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 429-30, 617 S.E.2d at 737.
65. Robison, 48 N.E.2d at 183.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
68. Robison, 48 N.E.2d at 185.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 58: 603
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2. Eaton v. Lovering
The Estate of Stevens court also cited Eaton v. Lovering70 to support its
holding.7 In Eaton, the testator created a trust for his son, whom he knew was a
spendthrift. 72 Eaton dealt with whether the son's ex-wife could recover alimony
from the son's interest in the trust, which was protected by a spendthrift
provision. 73 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held she could not.74 The
court also noted that when the testator created the trust "for the benefit of my
said son, as his needs may require,"75 the beneficiary had the right to have it
used for his benefit and the benefit of his family. 76 Like Robison, the terms and
factual circumstances of the trust in Eaton differ from the trust presented to the
South Carolina Court of Appeals.
The language used by the testator in the Eaton trust differs from the
language used by the testator in Estate of Stevens. In fact, the trust in Eaton
never used the word "support" in its terms, but it used the word "needs"
instead.77 Need is defined as "necessary duty."78 Support is defined as "to supply
with the means of maintenance; .. .to provide a basis for the existence or
substinence of."79 Because need encompasses the notions of duty and obligation,
using need manifested the testator's intent to include support of the beneficiary's
minor in authorized distributions of the trust funds. A parent's financial duty to
provide reasonable support to his or her minor child is a need of the parent that
may arise. The use of the term support does not manifest the same intent
because its definition does not include or refer to a duty or obligation owed to
one's children.
The Eaton trust had a sole beneficiary, and the testator knew the beneficiary
had a wife and daughter dependent on the beneficiary for support. 8" The
testator's knowledge distinguishes Eaton from Estate of Stevens. The Eaton
70. 125 A. 433 (N.H. 1924).
71. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. 427,432,617 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 2006
S.C. LEXIS 380 (Nov. 14, 2006).
72. Eaton, 125 A. at 433.
73. Id.
74. d.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Compare supra text accompanying note 11 with supra text accompanying note 73-74.
78. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1512 (2002).
79. Id. at 2297. The master-in-equity in Estate of Stevens stated the definition of "support":
That which furnishes a livelihood; a source or means of living; subsistence,
sustenance, [maintenance] or living. In a broad sense the term includes all such
means of living as would enable one to live in the degree of comfort suitable and
becoming to his station in life. It is said to include anything requisite to housing,
feeding, clothing, health, proper recreation, vacation, traveling expense, or other
proper cognate purposes; also[,] proper care, nursing, and medical attendance in
sickness, and suitable burial at death.
Record on Appeal, supra note 12, at 5 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1439 (6th ed. (1990))).
80. Eaton, 125 A. at 433.
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court clearly indicated that it based its holding on the totality of the evidence
presented.8' The court stated,
It is clear, therefore, that when the words of the will are read in
the light of these facts, the testator intended to . . . [give] his
son . . . the right to require the trustee to use this fund for his
benefit and the benefit of those dependent on him for support,
for, as the needs of a married man are sometimes construed,
they include not only his needs, but also the needs of his
family... 82
This analysis of the needs of a married man presents a different issue than an
analysis for the support of a beneficiary unmarried and childless at the creation
of a trust. Because of the differing terms of the Eaton trust and facts surrounding
them, which facts did not exist in Estate of Stevens, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals should not have used Eaton to support its holding.83
3. First National Bank of Beaumont v. Howard
The South Carolina Court of Appeals also cited to First National Bank of
Beaumont v. Howard4 as its final support in concluding the trustee may
consider the needs of the beneficiary's family.85 The testator in Howard created
a trust for his two daughters, granting each of them a one-half interest in the net
income.86 The trust further provided that, in the event either daughter died, her
surviving issue would receive the mother's interest in the net income. The trust
also permitted the trustee to invade the principal of the trust in specified
circumstances:
81. The court noted, "The evidence relevant to this issue consists of the words the testator used
read in the light of the situation of the parties, together with his knowledge of his son's habits." Id.
82. Id (emphasis added).
83. This argument also applies to the South Carolina Court of Appeals's use of Finch v. Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., 577 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), to support its holding in Estate of Stevens v.
Lutch, 365 S.C. 427, 432, 617 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2006), cert denied, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 360
(Nov. 14, 2006). Finch includes distinguishable facts similar to those in Eaton. Finch, 577 S.E.2d at
307, 309. Interpreting a trust for the "reasonable needs" of a beneficiary, the Finch court concluded the
trustee erred in determining that the invasion of the trust funds for the purpose of funding the
beneficiary's familial gift giving was beyond its discretion. Id. The testator in Finch established the trust
for his wife, the sole income beneficiary, and authorized the trustee to invade the principal of the trust
if the income proved insufficient to meet her "reasonable needs." Id. at 307. The testator also knew he
and his wife had children when he created the trust, and he made them remaindermen to the trust. Id.
Thus the language mirrors that of the Eaton trust and is distinguishable from the facts of Estate of
Stevens.
84. 229 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1950).
85. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 432, 617 S.E.2d at 738.
86. Howard, 229 S.W.2d at 783.
87. Id.
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In the event the net income from [the trust] shall be insufficient
in the discretion and judgment of the Trustee to properly
maintain and support those persons who, under the preceding
paragraph are entitled to portions of said net income and to
enable said persons to procure necessary and reasonable
medical care, aid and assistance, and to give said persons
proper educational advantages[,] [then the Trustee may invade
the corpus for those purposes.]8"
The Howard court also noted a third provision to the trust, which stated, "In the
event payments of principal are made to any of the beneficiaries under the above
provision, such payments shall be charged against the interest of the persons to
whom payments are made." 9
The issues in Howard revolved around the construction of these provisions.
The two beneficiaries sued the trustee, contending that the trust language
demonstrated their father's intent to have the trustee pay them out of the corpus
if the net income proved insufficient to maintain them, regardless of any other
property or income they or their husbands may have had.9" The court concluded
the testator's intention concerning payments from the principal of the trust was
unclear and looked at several factors to discern the testator's intent. 9' These
factors included "the value of the estate, the previous relations between [the
testator] and the beneficiaries, and all the circumstances in regard both to the
estate and the parties existing when the will was made and when the settlor
died. '92 After reviewing these factors, the court concluded that, on the basis of
need only, the trustee may invade the principal to provide a college education
for the beneficiaries' sons.93
Like the previously discussed cases cited by the South Carolina Court of
Appeals in Estate of Stevens, the Howard trust terms are distinguishable from
the terms of the Stevens trust. Although the Howard trust and the Stevens trust
both included two beneficiaries, the language creating the trusts and the interests
granted differed significantly. The testator in Howard granted his daughters
equal income interests in the trust,94 unlike the substantially unequal income
interests the testator in Estate of Stevens created. 95 The testator also manifested
his intent for continuing his practice of impartiality between the beneficiaries
through the third paragraph of the trust, which ordered the trustee to charge
principal distributions against the beneficiary requesting such payments.96 Thus,
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 784.
91. Id. at 783.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 786.
94. Id. at 783.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
96. Howard, 229 S.W.2d at 786.
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one beneficiary could not invade the principal and affect the other beneficiary's
income interest.97 In contrast, no impartiality existed in the Estate of Stevens
trust, as the testator clearly favored one beneficiary over the other by granting a
substantially unequal income interest in the trust.
Another distinguishing factor in the language used in the Howard trust as
opposed to the Stevens trust is the testator's direction to the trustee to apply
principal funds for the maintenance and support of "those persons who, under
the preceding paragraph are entitled to portions of said net income . . . and to
give said persons proper educational advantages." 98 This language creates an
ambiguity regarding for whose benefit the testator intends to allow the trustee to
invade the principal, because the trust entitles the beneficiaries and their sons to
net income, even though the sons only have a remainder interest. The use of the
ambiguous phrase "said persons" in Howard9 differs from the clear direction
given by the testator in Estate of Stevens that authorizes the invasion of the
principal for the support and maintenance "of my said children, LAURA
STEVENS and PAUL STEVENS."' 0'
A final distinguishing factor reviewed by the Howard court lies in the
circumstances between the testator and beneficiaries at the creation of the trust.
The Howard court concluded that the testator, at the creation of the testamentary
trust, knew that each of his daughters had a son in high school and that he
intended for his grandsons to have a college education, just as he had provided
for his daughters.' These factual circumstances did not exist between the
parties in Estate of Stevens because neither beneficiary was married nor had
children at the creation of the will or at the testator's death. 12
Because the differing terms of the Howard trust and facts surrounding its
creation did not exist in Estate of Stevens, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
should not have cited Howard in reaching its holding in Estate of Stevens.
C. The Issue Created by the Terms of the Trust in Estate of Stevens
In its analysis in Estate of Stevens, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
failed to distinguish the specific terms of the trusts and to harmonize the
differing factual circumstances of the cases followed by the court. In addition,
the court misidentified the beneficiaries' interests in the Estate of Stevens. These
factors show the court failed to properly address the issue before it. Thus, Estate
of Stevens presented an issue based on the particular terms and factual
circumstances of the trust in question. The court should have addressed whether
a testator, who established substantially unequal income interests in a trust for
97. Id.
98. Id. at 783.
99. Id.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12; see also infra Section IV (discussing the testator's
intent through the use of the term "children" and the legal significance attached to the term).
101. Howard, 229 S.W.2d at 786.
102. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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his two specifically named children, intended for a trustee to distribute portions
of the principal and accumulated income for funding his grandchildren's private
education, when distributions are permitted "for the support and maintenance of
my said children," even though neither beneficiary had a spouse or children at
the creation of the trust.
IV. DISCOVERING THE TESTATOR'S INTENT UNDER THE PARTICULAR TERMS OF
THE TRUST IN ESTATE OF STEVENS
The court should have affirmed the master-in-equity's decision and held the
terms and circumstances involved in the creation of the trust reflected the
testator's intent for the trust funds to support only the named beneficiaries and
not the beneficiaries' current or future children.
A. South Carolina Law Concerning Construing Terms of a Trust
The primary consideration in construing a trust is to discern the testator's
intent. 03 In ascertaining the testator's intent, a court must first look to the
language of the instrument, and if the language "is perfectly plain and capable of
legal construction, such language determines the force and effect of the
instrument.104 "[I]n arriving at the intention of the testator every [i]tem must be
considered in relation to other portions of the will . . . ."10 "If the intention of the
settlor appears on the face of the agreement, then the court will effectuate it,
unless it is in conflict with principles of law."' 6 "In such circumstances,
construction of the trust instrument is a question of law and the court should not
resort to extrinsic evidence to determine the purpose of the trust."'0 7 In
ascertaining the testator's intent, the language used will be given its ordinary
meaning."'
B. The Terms of the Estate of Stevens Trust Reflect the Testator's Intent
Although the Estate of Stevens court concluded "the questioned distributions
fall within the discretionary authority of the trustees, subject of course to
traditional judicial oversight of possible abuse of trustee discretion,"' °9 it did so
103. Chiles v. Chiles, 270 S.C. 379, 383, 242 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1978).
104. Id. at 383-84, 242 S.E.2d at 429 (quoting Superior Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maners, 261 S.C. 257,
263, 199 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1973)).
105. Black v. Gettys, 238 S.C. 167, 174, 119 S.E.2d 660, 663 (1961) (citing Rikard v. Miller, 231
S.C. 98, 102, 97 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1957)).
106. Germann v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 286 S.C. 34, 38, 331 S.E.2d 385, 388 (citing Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Auman, 259 S.C. 263, 269, 191 S.E.2d 511, 513-14 (1972)).
107. Id. at 38, 331 S.E.2d at 388.
108. First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Hutson, 142 S.C. 239, 242, 140 S.E. 596, 597 (1927).
109. Estate of Stevens v. Lutch, 365 S.C. 427, 432, 617 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005), cert.
denied, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 380 (Nov. 14, 2006).
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without any discussion about the testator's intent behind the phrase "support...
of my said children." The court declared it the testator's intent to vest
discretionary authority in the trustees and held that a trustee may consider the
familial obligations of a beneficiary "when determining what distributions" of
the principal would be "necessary and advisable for the beneficiary's
support."1 0 However, "no matter how broad and absolute the attempted grant of
discretion to the trustee, a court may always review the trustee's performance in
light of the standards of good faith and proper regard for the settlor's intent."'
II
Although the testator in Estate of Stevens intended to vest broad discretion
in the trustees, such discretion authorized the trustees to determine only what
distributions were appropriate for the beneficiaries' support and did not
authorize discretion to make payments for the support of the beneficiaries'
current or future children. The clear and unambiguous language used in the trust
provision in question requires a plain reading under South Carolina law." 2 Thus,
under the plain meaning of the trust language, "support and maintenance of my
said children," the court should have affirmed the master-in-equity's decision
and held the trustees lack authorization to make distributions from the principal
for the private education of the beneficiary's minor children.
1. The Ordinary Meaning of the Specific Terms of the Estate of
Stevens Trust Supports the Master-in-Equity's Decision.
The testator in Estate of Stevens identified his beneficiary-children
specifically by name three times, each time in capital letters. 13 Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that if the decedent wanted to benefit his then unborn
grandchildren during his children's lifetimes, he would have clearly and
specifically stated so. Because the testator used the phrase "support and
maintenance of my said children, LAURA STEVENS AND PAUL STEVENS,"
he instead intended to benefit only his children, whom he specifically named
during his lifetime. In fact, when the testator intended to benefit the issue of his
children (after the death of a child) he was quite clear and specific in saying
SO.
1 14
Further evidence that the testator intended to authorize the trustee to invade
the principal only for the beneficiaries of the trust, and not the beneficiaries'
children, comes from Article VI of the Will. The testator defined children as "the
lawful blood descendants in the first degree of the parent designated.""' 5 The
testator's effort to define the specific term that he used in the support provision
110. Id. at 432-33, 617 S.E.2d at 738-39 (internal punctuation omitted).
111.1 S. ALAN MEDLIN, ESTATE PLANNING IN SOUTH CAROLINA: THE LAW OF WILLS AND TRUSTS
§ 508.2(b) (2002) (citing Sarlin v. Sarlin, 312 S.C. 27, 30, 430 S.E.2d 530, 532 (Ct. App. 1993); Page
v. Page, 243 S.C. 312, 315, 133 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1963)).
112. See supra Part IV.A.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
114. See supra text accompanying note 34.
115. Record on Appeal, supra note 12, at 119.
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clearly indicates his intent to support only those persons included in such
definition with the principal of the trust.'6
In Black v. Gettys,"7 the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted a trust
that, after a certain period of time, gave one-half of the income of the trust "to
my wife, Ola, . . . and one-half ... or such part of said income not paid to my
wife, to my children, Nancy Jean Lovick, Anna, John and Betty (per stirpes)." I"
One issue before the court was whether or not the use of per stirpes in the will
caused the distribution to be to a class, which would postpone vesting of the
contingent remainder and thus invalidate the will under the rule against
perpetuities." 9 The court held that the children were to take as individuals
because they were specifically named as the beneficiaries of a portion of the
trust.120 The court went on to state the following:
The word "children" is not ordinarily construed as including
grandchildren. Moreover, this gift is not to "children" as a
class, but to named individuals. We find nothing to indicate
that the testator intended to make a gift ... to grandchildren. It
is apparent that he knew how to express his intention when his
purpose was to provide for a grandchild as evidenced by [his
devising of $1,000 to each of them].121
Like the trust in Black, the language of the Estate of Stevens trust also uses the
term children and specifically names each child to take under the trust. 122 By
including a beneficiary's familial support obligations within the meaning of
support, the court of appeals destroyed the plain meaning of the terms in the
Stevens trust. While the court does not confuse the terms children and
grandchildren, the court implies that so long as a direct benefit to the grandchild
can be recharacterized as a familial obligation of the child-beneficiary, then the
trust can fund this obligation. This construction runs counter to the trust's
singular emphasis on the children.
The testator's intentional granting of substantially unequal income interests
in the trust also manifests the testator's intent that only the named beneficiaries
may receive principal funds from the trust. As previously discussed, the South
116. The Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) also supports this notion:
When the donor of property describes the beneficiaries thereof as "children"
of a designated person, the primary meaning of such class gift term excludes
descendants of such person more remote than those of the first generation. It is
assumed, in the absence of language or circumstances indicating a contrary intent,
that the donor adopts such primary meaning.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 25.1 (1988).
117. 238 S.C. 167, 119 S.E.2d 660 (1961).
118. Id. at 175, 119 S.E.2d at 663 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 173, 119 S.E.2d at 662, 664.
120. Id. at 177-78, 119 S.E.2d at 665.
121. Id. at 181, 119 S.E.2d at 666 (citations omitted).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
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Carolina Court of Appeals appeared to answer the issue presented before it
based on generalized notions of traditional trust terms. 123 However, the inclusion
of multiple beneficiaries by the testator in Estate of Stevens complicates the
issue beyond generalized standards. 24 It is unlikely the testator granted his
daughter favored status in the income of the trust while granting his son the right
to invade the principal for numerous familial obligations; the son's actions could
reduce the amount of principal and, in turn, the income the daughter received.
Finally, the ordinary meaning of the spendthrift provision used in the trust
manifests the clear intent of the testator to not allow trust funds to be used for
the payment of "obligations" of the beneficiaries.'25 The South Carolina Court of
Appeals's holding permitting the trustee to invade the principal for the familial
obligations of the beneficiary completely contradicts the specific language of the
spendthrift provision and provides no reasoning for its disregard of the
provision.
Together, the ordinary meaning of these terms, including the use of the
specific beneficiaries' names three times in capital letters, the specific use of the
word children, and the inclusion of its definition; the substantially unequal
income interests created by the trust; and the inclusion of a spendthrift provision
indicate that the testator did not intend for the trustee to invade the principal of
the trust for the support of anyone besides the testator's "said children, LAURA
STEVENS and PAUL STEVENS."
2. Cases from Other Jurisdictions Support the Master-in-Equity's
Decision
A decision from Massachusetts, Burrage v. Bucknam, 2 6 supports the
argument that the plain meaning of the phrase "support and maintenance of my
said children" does not include a beneficiary's children. Burrage involved a suit
against the trustee for the trustee's denial of a request for support by and on
behalf of the former wife and child of a beneficiary from the beneficiary's
trust 12 7 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded the following:
123. See supra text accompanying notes 29-41.
124. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts addresses issues presented by multiple beneficiaries:
Questions about the presumed meaning of standards and the significance of
beneficiaries' other resources are complicated when a trust has multiple
discretionary beneficiaries, whether of the same or different generations.
Difficulty of generalization through rules or preferences is aggravated by the
number and interrelatedness of issues and alternative meanings to be considered,
and by diversity in the terms of these discretionary powers, in the purposes and
size of trusts, and in the beneficiaries' circumstances and their relationships to the
settlor and to one another.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. f (2003) (emphasis added).
125. See supra note 17 and text accompanying notes 17-18.
126. 16 N.E.2d 705 (Mass. 1938).
127. Id. at 705.
[Vol. 58: 603
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss3/9
ESTATE & FAMILY LAW
We are not convinced that the straightforward and
unqualified direction to pay the income to [the beneficiary] can
be construed to mean that part of the income shall be paid to his
former wife or to a guardian of his child. Neither the wife nor
the (then unborn) child is mentioned anywhere in the will as the
recipient of such payments. To read their names into this clause
of the will is to do violence to the plain words of the testatrix.1
28
The language the Burrage court interpreted mirrors the language used in the
trust in Estate of Stevens.'29 Violence also is done to the plain words used in the
Stevens trust, when the South Carolina Court of Appeals reads Paul Stevens's
minor children into the will. Now Paul Stevens may invade the principal for
reasons the testator did not intend and reduce the amount of income the testator
intended for Laura Stevens to receive from the trust.
In re Wells' Will '3 also supports a narrow interpretation of the term support.
In Wells, the decedent created equal trusts for the support of her
grandchildren. 3 ' The trust terms "authorize[d] the use by the executor of any
part or all of the principal and accumulations of any one of said equal parts of
said trust funds for the support of any one of the beneficiaries if, in the opinion
of the executors, it is advisable to do so. '32 The trustee petitioned the court for
an order permitting payments for the beneficiary's education.'33 The court
concluded the provision was unambiguous 34 and stated that support, as a word
of general welfare, "import[s] the welfare of the body, while the word
'education' imports the cultivation of the mind.' ' 135 Thus, "'[t]o support' is not to
educate," although the court recognized that "in many cases, as between parent
and child, support also includes the expenses of education.'
' 36
However, the court noted under the Personal Property Law of New York,
when income accumulates from personal property for the benefit of an otherwise
destitute minor, a court may order the funds to be used for the minor's support or
education.'37 Thus, the court concluded the trustee had authority to apply
accumulated income for the educational purposes of the minor based on state
law, but the terms of the trust permitted the trustee to apply the principal of the
trust only for the support of the beneficiary, which did not include education
128. Id. at 706.
129. Compare the language in Estate of Stevens, supra text accompanying note 12, with the
provision in question before the Burrage court, authorizing the trustee "to expend so much of the net
income of said fund as is in their judgment necessary or proper for the education, maintenance or
support of my said son." Burrage, 16 N.E.2d at 706.
130. 300 N.Y.S. 1075 (Sur. Ct. 1937).
131. Id. at 1077.
132. Id. (emphasis removed).
133. Id. at 1079.
134. Id. at 1077-78.
135. Id. at 1078-79.
136. Id. at 1079.
137. Id. (quoting N.Y. PERS. PROP. Law § 17 (1909)).
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expenses. '38
The interpretation in In re Wells' Will correctly articulates the testator's
intent, which the South Carolina Court of Appeals should have recognized in
Estate of Stevens. If support does not include the education of a beneficiary
directly benefiting from a trust, then it logically should not include the
educational expenses for a beneficiary's child. Even though the Wells court
noted that support, when used in the context of parent and child, may include the
expense of education, such a context does not exist in the Estate of Stevens trust.
The testator clearly authorized the trustee to apply principal and accumulated
income for the "support . . . of my said children." This phrase makes no
reference to any duty the beneficiaries may have regarding their own children,
and in fact, neither of the beneficiaries had a spouse or children at the time of the
testator's death.
139
The similarity of the terms of the trusts in these cases to the terms of the
Stevens trust should have led the South Carolina Court of Appeals to apply
similar reasoning. These cases support the conclusion that the plain meaning of
the phrase "support and maintenance of my said children" does not include a
beneficiary's child.
3. Extrinsic Evidence Supports a Holding That the Testator Did Not
Intend for the Principal of the Trust to Support the Beneficiaries'
Current or Future Children.
Even if the language of the Stevens trust is deemed ambiguous, extrinsic
evidence supports the master-in-equity's holding. The lack of spouse or children
by both beneficiaries at the time of the testator's death evidences the testator's
intent to support only his children. Section 19.04 of Trust Administration and
Taxation states the following:
The fact that the beneficiary is supporting a family is an
element to be taken into account in determining the amount
necessary for his support. However, if the beneficiary's family
obligations were acquired long after the trust was drawn or
became effective, then this fact may cause the court to decide
not to take family needs into account.14
To support the proposition that a court may not take the beneficiary's familial
obligations into account if acquired long after the trust was drawn or became
effective, Nossaman and Wyatt cite Cavett v. Buck,'4' noting when the testator
138. Id. at 1079-80.
139. See supra text accompanying note 21.
140. 1 WALTER L. NOSSAMAN & JOSEPH L. WYATT, JR., TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATION,
§ 19.04[2] (2006) (citations omitted).
141. 397 P.2d 901 (Okla. 1964).
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drew the will and when he died, the beneficiary was a small child. 42 The
rationale of Cavett was part of the basis for the master-in-equity's decision in
Estate of Stevens that the trustees were not authorized to make the distribution in
question. 143
In Cavett, which relied on Burrage v. Bucknam, 144 a testator created a trust
for the benefit of his five children. 145 The trust further stated that if any of the
testator's children should die leaving surviving children, then the executors were
authorized "to make payments from the income of [the testator's] estate ... they
shall deem reasonably necessary, just and proper for the care, maintenance,
support and education of each such grandchild of [the testator's].' ' 46 In addition,
the trust also provided it was "the purpose and intention of this trust to create a
fund for payments to the beneficiaries thereof for their individual support and
maintenance.',
147
The plaintiff in Cavett was the grandson of the testator and son of a
deceased beneficiary. 48 The testator died in 1938.' 4 The plaintiff did not marry
until 1959, then adopted his wife's three children in 1960 before having two
more children. 5 ° The plaintiff sought a substantial increase in monthly
income.'' The trustees and beneficiaries contended that under the terms of the
trust, the discretionary support was applicable only to the plaintiff, and they
could not consider the plaintiffs family when deciding whether to increase his
funds.' The court concluded that the trust provisions for the "discretionary
care, maintenance and support" of the beneficiary cannot include the
beneficiary's wife and children.
153
The factor the Cavett court emphasized most was that, in cases relied on by
the plaintiff for the proposition that support of a beneficiary also includes
support of his wife and children, the beneficiary was already married or the
testator anticipated the beneficiary would marry. 54 The fact that the court
specifically mentioned the twenty-one years between when the testator died and
when the plaintiff beneficiary married demonstrates the reasoning of the Cavett
court that the plaintiff beneficiary could not rely on those cases."
With facts strikingly similar to Cavett, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
142. 1 NoSSAMAN & WYATT, supra note 140, § 19.04[2].
143. Estate of Stevens v. Lutch, 365 S.C. 427,432 n.2, 617 S.E.2d 736, 738 n.2 (Ct. App. 2005),
cert. denied, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 380 (Nov. 14, 2006).
144. 16 N.E.2d 705 (Mass. 1938); see supra note 129 and text accompanying notes 126-129.
145. Cavett, 397 P.2d at 903.
146. Id
147. Id at 904.
148. Id at 903.
149. Id
150. Id at 903-04.
151. Id at 903.
152. Id at 904.
153. Id at 905.
154. Id
155. See id at 903-04.
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could have followed the rationale of Cavett in Estate of Stevens to affirm the
master-in-equity's decision that "support and maintenance of my said children"
does not include private education expenses for a beneficiary's minor. However,
the court decided to follow the rationale of other jurisdictions. 156 In a footnote,
the court of appeals stated the Cavett court acknowledged that other cases
(including those cases the South Carolina Court of Appeals found persuasive)
157
included the needs of a beneficiary's family in interpreting the term support, but
the Cavett court distinguished its case based on trust language specifically
limiting distributions to those made for the "individual support" of the
beneficiary. 158 Since the limiting language of the trust in Cavett was not
employed in the trust in Estate of Stevens, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
believed the Cavett court would not necessarily decide the issue in Estate of
Stevens differently than it was decided.
59
Thus, the Cavett court would probably decide Estate of Stevens to exclude
familial obligations not contemplated by the testator. In Estate of Stevens, the
testator died before either of his children married or had children, 6 ' and as
Nossaman and Wyatt conclude, Paul Stevens's familial obligations need not be
taken into account.
V. CONCLUSION
Niles Stevens, testator of the trust in Estate of Stevens, did not intend for the
trustee to invade the principal to support the familial obligations of his intended
beneficiaries. The master-in-equity correctly held that the trustees are not
authorized to make distributions to the beneficiaries for the health, support,
maintenance, and education of their current or future children. 16' The South
Carolina Court of Appeals followed cases which dealt with distinguishable trust
terms and factual circumstances. The plain meaning of the specific trust terms
used by Niles Stevens, along with the precedent discussed by this Note, support
a narrow interpretation of the term support to include only the named
beneficiaries.
Following Estate of Stevens, however, consideration of a beneficiary's
familial obligations falls within a trustee's discretion when determining what
constitutes a proper distribution for the beneficiary's support.'62 Unfortunately,
this holding does not provide useful guidance to trustees in South Carolina. In
fact, the decision may complicate matters for South Carolina trustees, as the
156. See Estate of Stevens v. Lutch, 365 S.C. 427, 432, 617 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 380 (Nov. 14, 2006).
157. Cases include Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., discussed supra Part III.B. 1, and Eaton
v. Lovering, discussed supra Part III.B.2. Cavett, 397 P.2d at 905.
158. Estate of Stevens, 365 S.C. at 432 n.2, 617 S.E.2d at 738 n.2.
159. Id. at 432 n.2, 617 S.E.2d at 738 n.2.
160. Id at 737.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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court opened up a vast array of reasons for a beneficiary to request the invasion
of the principal of a trust, failing to limit the scope of allowable familial
obligations. The interpretation of the vague familial obligations standard will
likely be the subject of future litigation.
Maybe it is only ironic that Niles Stevens granted his son $5,000 of income
from the trust each year-the exact amount requested by Paul Stevens for the
private education of his children.'63 Then again, perhaps Niles Stevens knew
exactly what he was doing. Whether or not Niles Stevens intended for this trust
money to be used to send his grandchildren to private school will remain a
mystery; however, one thing is certain: testators in South Carolina should
beware, for as Jeremy Bentham once analogized common law to the "dog law"
of a master hitting a dog as punishment after the fact, 6 4 testators have been
beaten.
Joey Bowers
163. Record on Appeal, supra note 12, at 37.
164. See BENTHAM, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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